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REFUSING TO FOLD: HOW LAWRENCE DICRISTINA WENT 
BUST FIGHTING FOR A NOVEL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS ACT 
Jonathan Hilton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Lawrence DiCristina was charged with violating the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act (IGBA) in 2011, he devised a novel defense: 
that the for-profit Texas hold ’em poker games he admitted to 
running could not lead to an IGBA conviction, since playing poker 
for money does not constitute “gambling.”1  Since Congress passed 
the IGBA in 1970, defendants (often deep-pocketed) have already 
tested the federal antigambling statute in nearly every conceivable 
way.  Yet, over forty years later, Jack Weinstein, a federal judge for 
the Eastern District of New York, agreed with the DiCristina’s novel 
interpretation in a 120-page slip opinion,
2
 leading poker players 
across the nation to rejoice.
3
  Particularly, Judge Weinstein held that, 
in order to obtain a conviction under the IGBA, prosecutors must 
show that the defendant’s business is of the gambling variety; i.e., 
that it is based on a “game of chance,” as defined by federal common 
law.
4
  Because DiCristina’s business involved Texas Hold ’Em—a 
“game of skill” under federal common law—it did not fall inside the 
IGBA’s purview.5 
The Second Circuit swiftly reversed Judge Weinstein.
6
  It held that 
DiCristina’s poker games indeed constituted gambling, because 
poker is illegal under the gambling laws of New York, where 
DiCristina’s games took place.7  Thus, the Second Circuit’s view is 
that an activity constitutes gambling under the IGBA whenever state 
law makes it so. 
 
*   Associate Member 2014–2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author wishes to 
express his gratitude to Professor Janet Moore for her guidance in the research of this piece.  The author 
also wishes to thank William Siderits and Kelly Pitcher for their input during the writing process. 
 1. United States v. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 2. United States v. DiCristina, No. 1:11-cr-00414-JBW (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012) (slip 
opinion). 
 3. See, e.g., Press Release, Poker Players Alliance, PPA Applauds Federal Court Ruling that 
Poker is a Game of Skill and Not Illegal Gambling (Aug. 21, 2012), available at 
https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/103497849?access_key=key-14ofv3favrb80jdvyv82. 
 4. DiCristina, 886 F.  Supp. 2d at 169–70. 
 5. Id. 
 6. United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).   
 7. Id. at 98 (“Pursuant to § 1955(b)(1)(i), we look to state law definitions of gambling.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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This Casenote criticizes the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
IGBA as problematic as a matter of statutory construction.  In 
addition to contending that Judge Weinstein’s interpretation is 
preferable, it argues that whether a particular activity constitutes 
gambling is a matter of fact that must be decided by a jury—it is not 
a matter of law for a judge, as Judge Weinstein held.
8
  Part II first 
provides the background of DiCristina’s case.  It then outlines the 
IGBA’s statutory text, summarizes the IGBA’s legislative and 
interpretive history, and offers an overview of the multitudinous 
definitions of gambling under state law.  Part III discusses specific 
flaws in the Second Circuit’s interpretation.  After accepting the need 
for a federal common law definition of gambling, it argues that 
Weinstein’s definition is sensible.  Then, it contends that the 
determination of whether an activity constitutes gambling should be 
decided by a jury.  Finally, Part IV speculates as to why the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the case, and what the impact of DiCristina 
might be on future IGBA cases. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Case Against DiCristina 
DiCristina’s arrest stemmed from his hosting twice-a-week poker 
“game nights” at his electric bike shop warehouse in Staten Island, 
New York.
9
  His poker club was a local two-table operation whose 
only advertising was by word of mouth—specifically, by text 
message.
10
  The club took a five percent “rake,” or cut, from each 
poker hand, a quarter of which it kept as profit.
11
  The prosecution 
alleged no other illegal activity by DiCristina.
12
  Nevertheless, his 
operation involved the efforts of “five or more persons” and had been 
in “continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days,” 
making it eligible for prosecution under the IGBA.
13
  DiCristina 
initially pled guilty; however, after devising his novel defense that 
playing Texas Hold ’Em for money did not constitute gambling, he 
withdrew his plea.
14
 
 
 8. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 168. 
 9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dicristina v. United States, 2013 WL 5936540, at *7 (Nov. 4, 
2013). 
 10. DiCristina, 726 F.3d at 95. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at *7. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1955(b)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2014). 
 14. DiCristina, 726 F.3d at 169. 
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The IGBA, part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
which includes, under Title IX, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), was passed to allow federal law 
enforcement to target the number-one source of revenue for 
organized crime: gambling operations.
15
  To the prosecution, 
DiCristina’s shop had all of the makings of organized crime.  First, 
Stefano Lombardo, DiCristina’s co-defendant who pled guilty early 
in the case, claimed in mitigation that he had agreed to promote game 
nights by text message to pay off a $5,000 gambling debt he owed 
DiCristina.
16
  The 33-year-old Lombardo, a single man living with 
his parents with a previous conviction for selling oxycodone, had 
fallen on tough times financially.
17
  He had seen DiCristina’s game 
nights as a way to raise money for himself and his family,
18
 but had 
instead ended up as a type of indentured servant. 
Second, the prosecution asserted that DiCristina’s operation 
“generated thousands of dollars of revenue, sought to conceal its 
existence from law enforcement and the public at large, and 
employed dealers, an armed security guard, and a waitress who 
doubled as a masseuse.”19  During hearings on the Organized Crime 
and Control Act, then Attorney General, John D.  Mitchell pledged 
that the Department of Justice would use the act’s broad provisions 
and open-ended language “strictly in accord with its legislative 
purpose,”20 that is, targeting organized crime, particularly mafia 
crime families.
21
  DiCristina, with his Italian surname and word-of-
mouth poker tournaments in Staten Island, was an obvious target. 
A jury initially convicted DiCristina.
22
  However, the court 
instructed that jury that poker constituted gambling under the IGBA 
as a matter of law.
23
  After the verdict, Judge Weinstein dismissed the 
indictment by holding that Texas Hold ’Em was not, in fact, 
 
 15. Id. at 208, citing Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Crim.  Laws & Procedures of the S. Comm.  on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 158 (Statement of Sen.  
Tydings), “[t]he greatest single source of revenue for organized crime is its gambling activities, which 
net an estimated seven (7) to fifty (50) billion dollars a year….” [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Hearings]. 
 16. Criminal Sentencing Memoranda, United States v. Stefano Lombardo, No. 11-CR-414 (S-2)-
01 (JBW), 2012 WL 3620370 (Mar. 13, E.D.N.Y.). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Government’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def’s Rule 29 Motion 1, United States v. 
DiCristina, No. 11-CR-414 (S-2) (JBW), 2012 WL 3620372 (July 27, E.D.N.Y.). 
 20. Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 194 (1970) (Statement of John N. Mitchell). 
 21. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 1st. Sess. 124 (1969). 
 22. United States v. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 23. Id. at 169. 
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gambling.
24
  He reasoned that although the IGBA outlaws certain 
kinds of “gambling businesses,” it did not precisely define the term 
gambling.
25
  In crafting a definition, Judge Weinstein used the 
common law and a nonexhaustive list of examples of gambling in the 
IGBA’s text, which featured lotteries, bookmaking, slot machines, 
and roulette wheels, among other chance-based games, as a guide.  
He eventually adopted the “predominance test” as his definition for 
gambling: “wagering something of value on the outcome of a game 
in which chance predominate[s] over skill.”26  Based on lengthy 
expert testimony, he concluded that Texas Hold ’Em poker is 
predominately a game of skill, making DiCristina’s conduct innocent 
under the IGBA.  He also ruled that whether a particular activity 
constitutes gambling under the IGBA is a matter of law, not a fact for 
the jury.
27
 
When the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge 
Weinstein’s dismissal, it used a plain-language approach to hold that, 
under the IGBA, there is no need for a federal common law 
definition of gambling; rather, the IGBA simply incorporates state 
law definitions of gambling.
28
  Because Texas Hold ’Em constitutes 
illegal gambling under New York state law, DiCristina’s poker 
business was gambling under the IGBA.
29
  The Second Circuit 
reinstated DiCristina’s conviction and remanded the case to Judge 
Weinstein for sentencing.
30
  DiCristina lost any potential reduction in 
the offense level he might have had by pleading guilty, but Judge 
Weinstein stayed the imposition of DiCristina’s sentence while the 
case was being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
31
 
B. The Statutory Text of the IGBA 
The IGBA is a relatively short statute, totaling just over five 
hundred words.  The first two parts state the elements of an IGBA 
offense: 
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or 
owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
 
 24. Id. at 235. 
 25. Id. at 201. 
 26. Id. at 227. 
 27. Id. at 168. 
 28. United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2013).   
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 94. 
 31. United States v. DiCristina, 2014 LEXIS 19038, at *4 (Jan. 24, 2014, E.D.N.Y.). 
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(b) As used in this section— 
(1) “illegal gambling business” means a gambling business 
which— 
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political 
subdivision in which it is conducted; 
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, 
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such 
business; and 
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous 
operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a 
gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day. 
(2) “gambling” includes but is not limited to pool-selling, 
bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or 
dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or 
numbers games, or selling chances therein . . .
32
 
Other parts include section (c), which sets the standard for 
probable cause for searches and seizures of illegal gambling 
businesses; section (d), which allows for civil forfeiture of properties 
used in violation of the IGBA; and section (e), which provides an 
exemption for a “bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance 
conducted by an organization exempt from tax.”33  The exemption in 
section (e) is relevant because, by noting that “similar game[s] of 
chance” were excluded from the IGBA, Judge Weinstein was able to 
conclude that whether a game is one of chance or skill is relevant to 
federal definition of gambling.
34
 
C. Legislative & Interpretive History 
According to then-President Nixon, the IGBA was included in the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 to allow the federal 
government to target “organized crime’s principal source of revenue: 
illegal gambling.”35  Congress believed that federal enforcement of 
state law was necessary because the mafia had corrupted local law 
enforcement officers.
36
  The previous federal antigambling statutory 
 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2014). 
 33. Id. 
 34. United States v. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 35. Id. at 203, citing S. Rep. No. 91-617 at 71 (1969). 
 36. The IGBA singles out for federal prohibition “the element of gambling operations involving 
the corruption of local law-enforcement officials . . . and to make it possible for the Federal government 
to intervene where local and State governments have become . . . incapable of law enforcement by 
reason of the corruption of responsible officials.” State v. Dadanian, 818 F.2d 1443(9th Cir. 1987), 
quoting S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1960). 
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scheme required the prosecution to prove a nexus, or specific link, 
between the particular instance of gambling at issue and interstate 
commerce.
37
  The IGBA capitalized on the Supreme Court’s 
expanded understanding of the Commerce Clause, particularly the 
“cumulative effects doctrine,” to eliminate the nexus requirement.38 
A proposed version of the IGBA had included a narrower 
definition of gambling, which stated that “illegal gambling business 
means betting, lottery, or numbers activity.”39  However, Congress 
eventually settled on a longer list, and it replaced the word “means” 
with the phrase “includes but is not limited to” in section (b)(2).   
Thus, although some of the original focus of the IGBA was on the 
mafia’s numbers racket, a type of lottery similar to the Powerball 
today, which at that time was “draining from the poorest inhabitants 
of our ghettos and slums and their families precious dollars which 
should be spent for food, shelter and clothing,”40 the IGBA was 
intended to have a wider scope.  The bill gave “broad latitude” to the 
Department of Justice to assist states in targeting organized crime.
41
  
Courts have interpreted the IGBA’s provisions broadly to 
accommodate Congress’s intent.  Although they have sometimes 
referenced the usual rule that criminal statutes should be construed 
narrowly,
42
 courts have primarily focused their analyses on 
construing the IGBA in accord with its legislative purpose.  That is, 
in the spirit of RICO, courts have recognized Congress’s intent to 
create a statute criminalizing broad swaths of behavior.  For instance, 
in United States v. Dadanian, the court held that a poker club was an 
illegal gambling business under the IGBA even though wagering on 
poker did not constitute illegal gambling under California state law.
43
  
Rather, the defendants’ business merely lacked a license to operate a 
poker club as required by city ordinance.
44
  Looking to the purpose of 
the IGBA, the court held that the city’s licensing requirement “surely 
 
 37. House Judiciary Hr’gs at 156–57 (statement of Att’y Gen. John N. Mitchell). 
 38. The IGBA easily survived early challenges to Congress’s authority to pass it under the 
Commerce Clause: “Illegal gambling has been found by Congress to be in the class of activities which 
exerts an effect upon interstate commerce.  Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is 
within the reach of federal power, the courts may not excise as trivial individual instances of the class.” 
United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1972), citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942). 
 39. S. 2022, 91st Cong.. 1st Sess. § 201; see also Br. and Special App. for the U.S., No. 12-
3720., 2012 WL 6800562, at 23 (Dec. 20, 2013, 2 Cir.). 
 40. Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 15. 
 41. Dicristina, 886 F.  Supp. 2d at 205, citing 116 Cong. Rec. 601 (Jan. 21, 1970) (statement of 
Sen. Hruska) (citations omitted). 
 42. F.C.C. v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954). 
 43. United States v. Dadanian, 818 F.2d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 44. Id. 
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is designed to prevent the infiltration of criminal elements into 
gambling” in the city, and noted that “[a]cceptance of the 
construction offered by the Dadanians would afford a shield to 
criminal activity.”45  In convicting the defendants, the court also 
considered that local police forces were corrupted in order to further 
the interests of the poker club, even though nothing in the text of the 
IGBA requires a showing of local corruption.  In stretching the text 
of the IGBA to fit the defendants’ behavior, the court noted that 
“[t]he collusion between the Dadanians and the local corrupt city 
administrator . . . is one of the kinds of conduct § 1955 
contemplated.”46 
Other portions of the IGBA have also been interpreted broadly.  
For instance, in United States v. Avarello, one court construed what 
were in fact two smaller, separate businesses as a single entity in 
order to satisfy the requirement under (b)(1)(ii) that a gambling 
business have five or more persons.  Specifically, it found that two 
bookkeeping operations were one business for purposes of the IGBA, 
because the evidence showed “a regular exchange of line information 
and layoff bets” between the two.47  Layoff bets allow bookkeepers 
to place bets against each other to diffuse risk.  Although the 
businesses had separate owners,
48
 the court construed them as one 
merely because they worked together. 
Additionally, courts have limited the defenses available to 
defendants in IGBA actions.  Thus, defendants have not been able to 
invoke some defenses that would otherwise be available under state 
law.  For instance, in United States v. Revel, the Fifth Circuit rejected 
the defendant’s argument that he could invoke the statute of 
limitations of the state whose law was used as a predicate for his 
IGBA conviction.
49
  The court noted that “Congress could have 
incorporated the [state] statutes of limitation under § 1955,” but it did 
not do so; the IGBA merely incorporated state law when defining the 
conduct prohibited.
50
  
In another case, United States v. Smalldone, the Tenth Circuit 
upheld an IGBA conviction even though the state law the defendant 
violated had been repealed before his prosecution.
51
  According to 
the Tenth Circuit, what mattered was that the defendant’s conduct 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. United States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1339 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 48. Id. at 1342–43. 
 49. United States v. Revel, 493 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 50. Id. at 2–3. 
 51. United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973). 
7
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was illegal under state law at the time he engaged in it, not whether 
the state law was still in force at the time of the indictment.
52
  
Notwithstanding this trend towards broad interpretation of the 
IGBA, one prior case did apply the rule of lenity to spare a 
defendant, as Judge Weinstein did.  In United States v. Gordon, the 
defendant’s gambling business had violated merely “nonpenal” 
regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission.
53
  The Ninth Circuit 
issued a short per curiam opinion holding that a defendant whose 
gambling business violated a nonpenal civil law, as opposed to a 
criminal law, could not be convicted under the IGBA.
54
  Because the 
element of the IGBA requiring that the defendant’s conduct be “a 
violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is 
conducted” could be plausibly read to refer to either state criminal 
law or civil law, the court applied the rule of lenity to acquit the 
defendant.
55
 
Given the sheer number of arguments already attempted by IGBA 
defendants, it is surprising that, more than forty years after the 
statute’s enactment, a trial court would accept a new defense to the 
statute.  Prior case law either stated or implied that there are only 
three elements, subsections (b)(1)(i),(ii), and (iii), of an IGBA 
violation.
56
  However, DiCristina’s argument essentially added an 
additional element to the offense.  Surprisingly, until DiCristina’s 
case, no court had ever opined as to what types of games constitute 
gambling under the IGBA.  In United States v. Atiyeh, the court 
passed on a similar question when a handler of gambling-related 
moneys asserted that was not involved in gambling under the IGBA; 
that is, he was a “mere custodian” of funds.57  The Atiyeh court 
brushed aside this defense, since the jury had found that Atiyeh’s 
conduct violated state gambling laws.  However, Atiyeh is not 
directly on point, because the defendant in that case was involved in 
a bookkeeping operation.
58
  Because bookkeeping is classified as 
“gambling” for purposes of the IGBA under section (b)(2), the 
defendant business was undoubtedly a gambling business. 
In United States v. Sacco, the Ninth Circuit expressed dicta 
possibly unfavorable to DiCristina’s argument.  There, the court held 
that the term “gross revenue” referred to the total amount wagered by 
 
 52. Id. at 1343–44. 
 53. United States v. Gordon, 464 F.2d 357, 357 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 57. United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 372 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 58. Id. at 359. 
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participants in one day, not the net profits of an illegal gambling 
business.  In doing so, it noted that Congressional intent “was to 
eliminate major gambling enterprises, regardless of the luck of the 
odds.”59  Nevertheless, that case interpreted the term gross revenue, 
not gambling, so its reference to luck was not on point. 
D. The Five State Law Definitions of “Gambling” 
Because the Second Circuit in DiCristina interpreted the IGBA as 
exclusively referencing state law definitions of gambling, and 
because Judge Weinstein’s interpretation would have involved 
piecing together various states’ common law definitions of gambling 
into one general, federal, common law standard, it is necessary to 
begin with a short overview of state definitions.  State definitions of 
gambling may be classified into four groups,
60
 although South 
Carolina may be alone in a fifth group.  The only mutual element 
shared by all four tests is that something of value must be staked on 
an uncertain future occurrence. 
1. Predominance test 
Under the predominance test, sometimes called the American 
Rule,
61
 courts consider whether skill or chance is more likely to 
influence the outcome of a contest.
62
  This test is used in a majority 
of states,
63
 and asks whether chance or skill predominates.
64
  The test 
imagines a continuum, with games of “pure skill,” that is, games 
involving total information and no randomness as to the outcome, on 
one end, and games of “pure chance,” such as roulette, on the other.65  
On the continuum, games similar to chess are considered games of 
skill, whereas games similar to roulette are deemed games of chance.  
Under the predominance test, wagering on a game of chance 
 
 59. Sacco, 491 F.2d at 995. 
 60. Anthony N. Cabot, Glenn J. Light & Karl F. Rutledge, Alex Rodriguez, a Monkey, and the 
Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill and 
Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 390 (2009). 
 61. See, e.g., Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento, S.E.2d 830, 836 (2012), reh’g denied (Jan. 
10, 2013). 
 62. Cabot et al., supra note 60, at 391. 
 63. Chuck Humphrey, State Gambling Law Summary, GAMBLING LAW U.S., 
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/State-Law-Summary/ (last updated 2007), shows that 36 states plus 
the District of Columbia use the predominance test.  Further research is needed to update Humphrey’s 
chart, however; for instance, South Carolina should not be considered in the predominance test category 
after Town of Mount Pleasant, S.E.2d 830 at 836. 
 64. Cabot, supra note 60, at 390. 
 65. Id. at 391. 
9
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constitutes gambling, but wagering on a game of skill does not.  
Although this test tends to be the most predictable of any of the state 
tests, there are considerable gray areas.  In particular, on the issue of 
poker, courts that apply the predominance test are split.  
66
 
In other cases, contests that could theoretically count as skill are 
sometimes labeled as chance on the continuum.  For instance, one 
court determined that shooting a hole-in-one on a golf course was an 
event determined by chance rather than skill, because the odds of 
doing so are low.
67
  An additional criticism of the predominance test 
is that it fails to take into account the identity of the players.  Because 
the predominance test focuses solely on the nature of the game at 
hand, it does not consider that the level of skill involved in some 
games depends entirely on whether or not the players themselves 
possess any skill.  For example, one paper has noted that if eight-
year-olds were to take a multiple-choice exam on quantum physics, 
the highest-scoring student would be the luckiest, not the most 
skillful.
68
 
2. “Material element” of chance test 
The “material element” test, applied by eight states, asks whether 
the element of chance is a factor that is material to the final result.
69
  
The test looks to whether chance “has more than an incidental effect 
on the game.”70  One scholarly work has criticized this test as being 
too subjective to be applied with any consistency and argues for its 
abandonment.
71
  It explains that chance being a material element 
essentially means that chance must have a logical connection to the 
outcome.  This may mean that the material element test would be 
satisfied by a game that contains any chance at all.
72
  For instance, 
under the material element test, Scrabble, a game in which a 
professional player would defeat an amateur 100% of the time,
73
 
could be considered a gambling game because the outcome between 
two evenly-skilled players could come down to the luck of which 
tiles are drawn.  Thus, the amount of chance involved in some 
Scrabble games could be more than incidental to the outcome.   
 
 66. Id. at 402. 
 67. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 86 (Nev. 1961). 
 68. Cabot, supra note 60, at 400-01. 
 69. Id. at 392. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Brief of Champion Scrabble and Bridge Players as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Dicristina v. United States, 2013 WL 6493518, at *6 (Dec. 6, 2013). 
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Judge Weinstein distinguished the predominance test from the 
material element test when he noted that the variant of poker played 
by DiCristina, although not gambling by his findings under the 
predominance test, would certainly be gambling under the material 
element test.
74
 
Under the predominance and material element tests, whether a 
given game is considered gambling is usually a matter of fact, not 
law.
75
  This allows for professional players to testify, for books of 
strategy to be admitted into evidence, and for mathematicians to 
testify as expert witnesses.  Throughout DiCristina’s trial, the 
defendant moved for Judge Weinstein to permit a jury trial on the 
issue of whether poker was gambling under the predominance test,
76
 
but Judge Weinstein instead reserved judgment for himself, ruling 
that it was an issue of law.
77
 
3. Any chance test 
In a handful of states, including Texas,
78
 courts apply the “any 
chance” test—that is, whether chance influences the outcome of the 
game at all.  Although this approach is perhaps the most predictable 
of the four, it has the downside of being so broad as to include 
virtually any game, particularly if taken to its logical extreme.  For 
instance, golf could be considered a game of chance because 
unpredictable wind patterns may influence the outcome of an 
occasional game.  Cabot, et al., postulate that even chess could be a 
game of chance under this test if one player, chosen at random, was 
given the advantage of the first move.
79
  Courts that apply the any 
chance test may face the disheartening task of labeling many games 
as gambling that the general public would consider contests of skill.   
4. “Gambling Instinct” Test 
A few courts apply a “gambling instincts” test that looks to 
 
 74. United States v. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d 164, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 (“The conclusion that poker is predominately a game of skill does not undermine the holding that poker 
is gambling as defined by New York law.  While both New York State law and the IGBA require that a 
game involves chance, each apply different standards in determining whether a particular game is a 
game of chance or a game of skill. . . .  The test under the federal statute is one of preponderance, not 
material degree.”). 
 75. Cabot, supra note 60, at 401. 
 76. DiCristina, 886 F.  Supp. at 171. 
 77. Id. 
 78. State v. Gambling Device, 859 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 79. Cabot, supra note 60, at 390. 
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whether an activity appeals to the player’s gambling instinct.80  This 
test has been criticized as “highly subjective,” “imprecise,” and “not 
susceptible to meaningful analysis by a trier of fact.”81  Courts may 
consider practically whatever criteria they wish: for instance, in the 
case of slot machines or pinball games, a court may consider whether 
the machine is considered “noxious” by the public, is “attractive to 
youth,” or provides “free plays” to attract players.82  Because of the 
wide criteria considered, the gambling instincts test is 
unpredictable.
83
  It also may merge with the “any wager” test, 
explained below, because the mere act of wagering may appeal to 
gambling instincts.
84
 
5. Any wager test 
A recent decision from the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
places that state into a unique category, which could be christened the 
“any wager” test.  Under § 16–19–40 of Title 16 of South Carolina’s 
penal code, wagering on games of any sort constitutes illegal gaming 
if the game is taking place at a prohibited location, such as a house 
“used as a place of gaming.”85  Thus, under South Carolina’s test, it 
is the presence of a wager on a game that constitutes illegal 
gambling, without reference to skill or to gambling instincts.  Unlike 
the gambling instincts test, the any wager test is straightforward, 
objective, and predictable, since all forms of wager are criminalized.  
However, even more so than the any chance test, the any wager test 
has the downside of criminalizing broad swaths of activity. 
E. Specifics of the Second Circuit’s Interpretation 
The Second Circuit held that the phrase illegal gambling business 
was defined in (b)(1)(i)–(iii).86  It reasoned that the insertion of the 
word means after the phrase illegal gambling business indicated that 
 
 80. Id. at 394. 
 81. Id. at 394, 412. 
 82. See, e.g., Heartley v. State, 157 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1941); Hunter v. Mayor & Council of 
Teaneck Twp., 24 A.2d 553, 555 (N.J. 1942). 
 83. Id. at 394 (“Because this test is highly subjective, a court decision can vary widely in its 
application to particular games.”). 
 84. This is certainly least the case when what is being wagered is a “thing of value.” See State v. 
Mint Vending Mach. No. 195084, 85 N.H. 22, 154 A. 224, 228 (1931) (“Any incitement which would 
impel the player to stake his money on a chance of winning would produce the evil consequences at 
which the [gambling instincts] enactment is aimed.”). 
 85. Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento, 737 S.E.2d 830, 837 (2012). 
 86. United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2013).   
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(i), (ii), and (iii) were the elements of the definition.
87
  Furthermore, 
the Second Circuit found that this explanation could be reconciled 
with Congress’s inclusion, in Section (b)(2), of a partial definition of 
gambling, because this list was nonexclusive.
88
  Specifically, the 
Court reasoned that Section (b)(2)’s purpose was only to serve “as an 
illustration of what may constitute running a gambling operation.”89  
It also noted that “[h]ad Congress intended to create a definition of 
‘gambling’ unique to the IGBA, or to confine the reach of the IGBA 
to businesses involving certain types of gambling, it could have 
inserted such language.”90 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Benefits of the Second Circuit’s Ruling 
Before delving into the weaknesses of the Second Circuit’s 
opinion, a couple of its strengths should also be duly noted.  By 
choosing to use the individual state definitions of gambling, the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation defers to state autonomy.  
Additionally, the interpretation potentially simplifies prosecution of 
the IGBA by removing the potentially costly step of proving that a 
particular activity is gambling under the predominance test.  It also 
eliminates a potentially strong defense against prosecution.  These 
benefits, however, are more limited than one might suppose.  First, 
when a federal criminal statute incorporates state laws, state 
autonomy is arguably more protected when the federal criminal 
statute is read to require additional elements.  For instance, in United 
States v. Maya, the court held that gambling offenses that constitute 
mere misdemeanors under state law could still be prosecuted as 
felonies under the IGBA, because it required illegal gambling 
businesses to also meet the additional revenue and size elements of 
(b)(1)(ii) and (iii).
91
  Second, prosecutions under the IGBA will only 
be simplified in the minority of states that do not use the 
predominance test.  Since some form of the predominance test is used 
in thirty-six states,
92
 this leaves just fourteen states in which adding a 
separate federal definition would add a hurdle to the prosecution. 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 100. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 99. 
 91. United States v. Maya, 541 F.2d 741, 748 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 92. Humphrey, supra note 63. 
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B. Arguments Against the Second Circuit’s Interpretation 
1. DiCristina’s Arguments 
DiCristina advanced numerous well-reasoned arguments against 
the interpretation eventually adopted by the Second Circuit.  For 
instance, DiCristina argued that in order for the nonexhaustive list 
under Section 1955(b)(2) to be given effect, it had to be read as a 
definition—one which Texas Hold ’Em poker would not readily fit.93  
Additionally, DiCristina argued that the Second Circuit’s 
construction ignored a basic principle of statutory interpretation; 
namely, that statutes should be read so as to give every word effect, 
leaving no word superfluous.
94
  Had Congress intended an illegal 
gambling business to consist merely of the elements in (b)(1)(i)-(iii), 
there would have been no need for it to insert the word gambling a 
second time.  For instance, under the Second Circuit’s interpretation, 
the statute would have had the same effect had (b)(1) read as follows: 
“ ‘illegal gambling business’ means a business which—,” effectively 
writing the word gambling out of the statute.   
DiCristina also argued another cannon of statutory construction: 
Congress is presumed to use the language of the common law.  The 
Second Circuit reasoned that, if Congress had wanted to create a 
separate federal definition of gambling, it could easily have easily 
stated so.  However, DiCristina’s argument highlights the problem 
with the Second Circuit’s reasoning on this point: the court ignored 
that Congress often chooses not to remain silent on the meaning of 
certain words in order to allow courts to apply general common-law 
definitions.
95
  When a common law definition of a word exists, 
Congress often uses that word without making any attempt to provide 
further clarification.  As spelled out above, there are many common 
law definitions for the word gambling.  In light of this principle, the 
Second Circuit should have adopted a federal common law definition 
of gambling. 
Finally, another one of DiCristina’s strong arguments was that 
Section 1955(e) allows churches exceptions for bingo and similar 
games of chance, and that it would make little sense for Congress to 
exempt only games of chance and not games of skill, meaning that it 
 
 93. Def. Lawrence Dicristina’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of his Mot. for a J. of Acquittal under 
Rule 29 of the Fed. R. of Crim. P., No. 11-CR-414 (JBW), 2012 WL 8899769 (July 19, 2012, 
E.D.N.Y.). 
 94. Id. 
 95. A term “comes with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing another way.” Safeco 
Ins.  Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007). 
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must have meant to adopt the predominance, material element, or any 
chance test.  Given the comparisons to bingo and lotteries, games of 
pure chance, Congress likely intended the IGBA to apply to games 
involving little or no skill.  Thus, adopting the predominance test 
would best comport with this intention, since games involving 51% 
skill would fall outside the scope of the IGBA. 
2. State Law Does Not Always Define “Gambling” 
The IGBA should be interpreted to include a federal definition, not 
just a state definition, of gambling for a number of reasons.  The 
most novel of those reasons is that state penal codes do not always 
define what constitutes gambling.  Although DiCristina did not make 
this argument, on one occasion, he came close.  In the prosecution’s 
memorandum in opposition to DiCristina’s Rule 29 motion to 
dismiss, the government claimed that in 49 states, poker was 
legislatively or judicially classified as gambling.
96
  DiCristina’s reply 
brief retorted that not only had the prosecution failed to provide 
support for this claim for 21 of those states, it also included state laws 
that merely regulated poker.
97
  
For instance, poker is considered a “controlled game” in 
California.
98
  However, it is not directly described by statute as 
gambling.  Although the controlled game statute appears under the 
“Gaming” chapter of the California Penal Code,99 there is no 
definitive statutory label stating that poker is gambling in that state.  
By interpreting the word gambling in the IGBA according to its 
common law meaning, rather than state definitions, the IGBA could 
be read in a way to give broader latitude to prosecutors in some 
cases, thus keeping with both the legislative intent of the statute and 
its plain language. 
A thought experiment may help to clarify matters.  Suppose that, 
after the passage of the IGBA, a state supreme court ruled that, due to 
the rise of increased availability of statistical analysis in certain 
sports, bookmaking under certain circumstances and for certain 
sports would no longer be considered gambling under the state’s 
gambling laws, which employ the predominance test to define 
gambling.  This is not a far-fetched scenario; as the prosecution 
 
 96. Gov’t’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.’s Rule 29 Mot., United States v. Dicristina, 2012 WL 
3620372, n. 3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2013). 
 97. Def. Lawrence DiCristina’s Rep. Mem., No. 11-CR-414 (JBW), Dicristina, 2012 WL 
3620373 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012). 
 98. Cal. Penal Code § 337(j) (West). 
 99. Cal. Penal Code, Part I, tit. 9, ch. 10. 
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noted, the Attorney General of New York opined that sports betting 
involves substantial skill,
100
 and a professor recently contended that it 
is “ridiculous to call either poker or sports betting a game of 
chance.”101 
Imagine that, in response to this hypothetical opinion, the state’s 
legislature responds by immediately outlawing bookmaking in all 
forms, but under a separate bookmaking act and not under the state’s 
gambling laws.  Would a bookmaker who fulfills the requirements of 
(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) be prosecutable under the IGBA? Under Judge 
Weinstein’s interpretation, the answer is obvious: yes, because 
bookmaking constitutes gambling under a federal common law 
definition that incorporates the language of (b)(2).  Under the Second 
Circuit’s approach, however, there is no easy answer.  The 
hypothetical activity would clearly be a violation of state law for 
purposes of (b)(1)(i), but it would also not be gambling under state 
law.  Therefore, under the Second Circuit’s approach, there would be 
no gambling business in question, and there could be no prosecutions 
under § 1955.  Yet § 1955 was clearly intended to reach bookmaking, 
as it is listed under section (b)(2).  By relying on section (b)(2) to 
define gambling, the prosecution would have an avenue to pursue 
bookmakers under the IGBA.  However, under the Second Circuit’s 
analysis, the IGBA would be rendered toothless.   
Yet even under the Second Circuit’s analysis, it would be possible 
to prosecute for some violations of state law not classified precisely 
as gambling.  For instance, in South Carolina, the statutes refer only 
to betting and gaming, not gambling.
102
  However, the Supreme 
Court of that state worked around this technicality by construing 
gaming and gambling as synonymous.
103
  However, finding 
controlled games to be synonymous with gambling begins to stretch 
the English language.  The further the wording of a state statute from 
the term “gambling,” the more difficult it would be to prosecute 
under the IGBA.   
 
 100. Gov’t’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.’s Rule 29 Mot., United States v. Dicristina, 2012 WL 
3620372, citing Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, Formal Opinion No. 84-F1, 
NY Op. Atty. Gen. 11 (1984). 
 101. Scott Van Voorhis, Profs back online poker, BOSTON HERALD (Oct. 22, 2007), 
http://www.bostonherald.com/business/business_markets/2007/10/profs_back_online_poker. 
 102. S.C. Code ANN. § 16–19–4, tit.16 (2014). 
 103. Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento, 737 S.E.2d 830, 832 (2012), reh’g denied (Jan. 10, 
2013). 
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3. Adjectives Modify the Nouns that Follow Them, Not That 
Precede Them 
A closer look at the statute reveals a serious problem with the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation.  Under a plain language 
interpretation, adjectives tend to modify the words following them, 
not ordinarily the words that precede them.
104
  This principle is easy 
to demonstrate.  For instance, if a statute bars certain suits against the 
post office for “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” of postal 
matter, it is trite learning that the adjective “negligent” applies only 
to the noun “transmission,” and not to “loss” and “miscarriage.”105   
In the IGBA, the reference to violations of state law in Section 
(b)(1)(i) is subsequent to the use of the words gambling business.  
Although there do exist postpositive adjectives, that is, adjectives that 
modify the nouns preceding them, these tend to be short and fairly 
obvious, for instance “accounts receivable,” “body politic,” “fee 
simple,” “force majeure,” and “proof positive.”106  Many of these 
phrases are of foreign origin, thus explaining the tendency to place 
the adjective after the noun.  Another common example of this 
phenomenon is the phrase “attorney general”—that is, a person who 
is really a general or all-purpose attorney.
107
 There is no such reason 
for the phrase violation of the law of a State to modify the word 
gambling here.  Therefore, the Second Circuit’s “plain language” 
analysis is grammatically flawed. 
C. Weinstein’s Definition of “Gambling” 
 Having accepted that the IGBA requires a federal common law 
definition of gambling, the question remains whether Judge 
Weinstein’s definition, which adopted the predominance test, was 
correct.  Judge Weinstein’s analysis included an evaluation of how 
the word gambling is used in other federal statutes.  He mustered an 
impressive, historical list of federal gambling laws that targeted 
games of chance.
108
  However, this by itself favors neither 
 
 104. For an illuminating discussion on this subject, see Watkins v. United States, No. 02 C 8188, 
2003 WL 1906176, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2003). 
 105. Id. 
 106. In re Swetic, 493 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013), citing BRYAN A. GARNER, 
Garner’s Modern American Usage 860 (2003). 
 107. Attorney, Online Etymological Dictionary, 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=attorneyhttp://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=attor
ney (last visited May June 12, 2015). 
 108. This list included 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (defining a gambling device as one which involves “the 
application of an element of chance”); 15 U.S.C. § 1178(2) (excluding from the statute devices that do 
not involve an element of chance); 18 U.S.C. § 1081 (using the term “game of chance,” in the definition 
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DiCristina’s nor the prosecution’s interpretation.  From the defense’s 
perspective, prior legislation defining gambling as focusing on games 
of chance could be used to show that Congress understands that 
gambling excludes games predominantly of skill.  However, the 
prosecution could just as plausibly argue that, because Congress did 
not explicitly limit gambling to games of chance in the IGBA (as it 
has done with other statutes in the past), it meant to use a broader 
definition or simply to use state definitions of gambling. 
For instance, Judge Weinstein identified one federal statute, the 
Transportation of Gambling Devices Act of 1951, which defined 
gambling as including an element of chance.
109
  The statute 
essentially defines a “gambling device” as a machine which delivers 
money or property “as the result of the application of an element of 
chance.”110  However, to reach this conclusion, the reader must first 
decode three dense paragraphs of statutory text, suggesting that 
Congress intended a highly specific definition of a gambling device.  
Although Judge Weinstein was attempting to show a federal 
legislative trend defining gambling as including chance, the 
prosecution could have effectively argued that, if Congress wanted to 
exclude games predominantly of skill from the IGBA, it would have 
done so explicitly, as it did in the 1951 Act.  The prosecution could 
also have argued that, since Congress has always included intricate 
definitions of gambling in the past, surely it would have explicitly 
defined gambling in the IGBA if it meant to include any definition 
other than the ones provided by the states. 
Instead, the prosecution identified two statutes that included 
definitions of gambling, National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission Act (NGISCA) and the Indian Gambling Regulatory 
Act (IGRA), arguing that they were relevant to interpretation of the 
IGBA.
111
  The prosecution insinuated that because these statutes 
included broad definitions of gambling, the definition of gambling in 
the IGBA should be broad, too.  Judge Weinstein quickly 
distinguished the IGRA from the IGBA on grounds that the IGRA 
“was designed to deal with the sensitive question of regulating Indian 
gaming establishments,” not organized crime.112  However, as above, 
one could argue additionally that, because the IGRA defines gaming 
 
of “gambling establishment”); 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (defining unlawful internet gambling, in relevant 
part, as the placing of a bet or wager on a “game subject to chance.” United States v. DiCristina, 886 F. 
Supp. 2d 164, 228–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 109. Id. at 228. 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1171. 
 111. Br. and Special App. for the U.S., supra note 39, at 33–34. 
 112. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 229. 
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in a highly specific fashion, it is irrelevant to any interpretation of the 
IGBA.  The IGRA carefully categorizes gaming into three classes, 
classes I, II, and III, and defines class II with a statutory segment 
comprising five parts, including multiple layers of subparts.  Thus, 
the argument that the IGRA suggests a broad general federal 
definition for gambling is weak. 
The prosecution’s argument regarding then NGISCA fairs little 
better, despite the text of the Act being added by Congress to the 
notes following the IGBA.
113
  In 1996, Congress, noting, among 
other things, the increasing trend by the states to legalize 
gambling,
114
 passed the NGISCA.  The Act formed a special 
commission to review the current practices of federal, state, local, 
and Native American governments regarding the legal status of 
gambling and to assess “the relationship between gambling and 
crime,” the impact of pathological gambling on the economy and 
society, and the extent to which gambling funds governments.
115
  The 
Commission, for purposes of its studies, was not to use a definition of 
gambling from the IGBA.  Rather, the Act defined gambling as “any 
legalized form of wagering or betting conducted in a casino, on a 
riverboat, on an Indian reservation, or at any other location under the 
jurisdiction of the United States. . . .”116 
Weinstein dismissed the relevance of the NGISCA because “its 
definition is different and substantially broader than that provided by 
the IGBA.”117  However, he could have added that, because the 
NGISCA defines gambling as any of certain types of activities that 
are legalized, it is irrelevant to the IGBA.  The IGBA focuses on 
illegal activities, not legal ones.  Additionally, the Commission’s 
purpose was to allow for a broad study of wagering activities; it is 
not a criminal statute.  Thus, neither DiCristina nor the prosecution 
was able to craft a convincing argument for the interpretation of 
gambling under the IGBA by comparing the IGBA to other statutes. 
However, Judge Weinstein’s definition stands even without the aid 
of other federal statutes.  First, when searching for a common law 
definition of a word, Judge Weinstein cannot be faulted for adopting 
the test used in a majority of states.  Additionally, the predominance 
test is particularly suited as a common law definition because it is 
nicknamed the American Rule, signifying its frequent use.  Also, as 
 
 113. 18 USC § 1955 (2014). 
 114. National Gambling Impact study Commission Act, Pub. L. 104-169, § 1019, 110 Stat. 1482, 
§ 2.(2). 
 115. Id. at Sec. 4, “Duties of the Commission.” 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 1955. 
 117. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 229. 
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Judge Weinstein and the defendant point out, Congress’s reference in 
Section 1955(e) to exemptions for a “bingo game, lottery, or similar 
game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax” 
supports a reading that evaluates the amount of chance, as opposed to 
the amount of skill, involved.
118
 I f courts were to include games of 
skill under the definition of gambling, it would be strange for 
Congress to exempt only games of chance under Section (e).
119
  
Adopting the predominance test comfortably accounts for this.   
D. Should What Constitutes Gambling Be Decided by Judges or 
Juries? 
Judge Weinstein concluded that whether a certain game constitutes 
gambling should be decided by judges as a matter of law.
120
  This 
approach ignores one of the fundamental realities of game play.  
Games themselves cannot be classified as games of chance or games 
of skill without reference to the circumstances under which they are 
played.  For instance, a game of chess between two unskilled 
children, or played by computers generating random moves, is 
merely a game of chance, despite the complexity and potential for 
skill inherent to the game itself.  As the prosecution pointed out, even 
bookkeeping, one of the games listed in section (b)(2) of the IGBA, 
involves enough skill to allow some professionals to make a living at 
it.
121
  
DiCristina countered that bookkeeping is not a true game of skill, 
because only a select few are good enough to wager on sports 
professionally; for the masses, sports betting is merely chance.
122
  
Thus, the identities and characteristics of the players matters.  
Certainly, when No Limit Texas Hold ’Em is played between skilled 
amateurs or professionals in a tournament setting, one could argue 
that skill predominates over luck, as DiCristina did in this case.  
However, this does not mean that the game nights at DiCristina’s 
warehouse were predominately games of skill.  Informal games 
between low-level players, where individual players may simply 
place a large sum on a single hand, win fortuitously, and then 
withdraw from the table are markedly different from tournament 
games, where the contestants must survive a certain number of hands 
 
 118. Br. for the Appellee, No. 12-3720, 2013 WL 1280639, at 17 (Mar. 21, 2013, 2nd Cir.) 
(emphasis added). 
 119. Id. 
 120. DiCristina, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 171. 
 121. Reply Br. of the U.S., 2013 WL 1840483, at 19–20, (Apr. 29, 2013 2nd Cir.). 
 122. Br. for Appellee, 2013 WL 1280639 *32, No. 12-3720, (March 21, 2013, 2nd Cir.). 
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before being allowed to cash out.  Thus, drawing a line in the sand 
and declaring Texas Hold ’Em to be categorically a game of skill as a 
matter of law fails to account for the circumstances surrounding the 
game. 
On the other hand, adjudicating on an ad hoc basis, as most states 
employing the predominance test do, leaves a high degree of 
uncertainty in the law.  However, anti-racketeering statutes, with 
their big mouths and sharp teeth, are designed for broad 
interpretation.  Accordingly, these statutes necessarily come with 
some uncertainty.  And in many cases, this uncertainty already 
existed; because most states use the predominance test, and since 
IGBA prosecutions must show that the defendant violated state 
gambling law, imposing this test at the threshold level to determine 
whether an activity is gambling under federal law would not impose 
too great a burden.  Additionally, a professional poker tournament is 
far less likely to be a source of revenue for organized crime than is 
the sort of informal warehouse games that DiCristina was running, so 
prosecutors could use their discretion to target only those poker 
games played under shadier circumstances with less skillful players. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although DiCristina appealed the Second Circuit’s ruling, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
123
  Quite likely, the Supreme Court 
did not see the point in reinterpreting a statute over forty years old.  
Also, DiCristina focused heavily on the question of whether 
“including-but-not-limited-to” clauses are definitions,124 a broad 
technical question that possibly took the focus away from the real 
issues of statutory construction to be decided in the case. 
DiCristina, by switching his plea from guilty to innocent, gambled 
and lost.  Was his roll of the dice entirely in vain?  It is too early to 
know for sure, but it is possible that DiCristina’s bold move may 
have paved the way for future defendants to fashion creative 
arguments as to what does and does not constitute gambling.  
However, because the Second Circuit held that an activity is 
gambling under the IGBA whenever state law makes it so, those 
arguments will necessarily focus on the definitions of gambling 
under state law.  For instance, if the facts of the State v. Dadanian 
case, in which the defendants were convicted for running a poker 
business without a proper license, were ever repeated, the defense 
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could contend that poker is not gambling under California law, but 
merely a controlled game.  In this way, defendants may be able to 
capitalize on the murkiness inherent to state gambling laws.  So, 
although DiCristina’s legal team may have lost this hand, perhaps 
future defendants will be able to use the Second Circuit’s ruling to 
stack the deck in their favor.   
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